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Abstract
The EU–Jordan Compact (hereafter Compact) has been identified as being a groundbreaking, comprehensive approach to
global refugee protection. Thus far, research on this underexplored case has mainly focused on the effects of the Compact.
The policy process leading to the adoption of the Compact, as well as the motivations of the EU (i.e., the main donor),
remain blackboxed. This article explores how the migration crisis affected the EU Commission’s ability to create coordi‐
nated, strategic action in external policy. It does so by tracing the internal EU negotiations and developing a causal model
that explains how the Commission could overcome silos and efficiently draft a policy proposal linking the issues of migra‐
tion and trade. The analysis is based on 13 original in‐depth interviews with EU representatives. The article contributes to
crisisification theory by presenting amechanism that explains how the Commission canmakeuse of crises. The Commission
created cohesion by reframing the crisis, identifying the relevant policy tools with which to address it, and by reframing
the responsibilities of the relevant directorate‐general. Furthermore, by utilizing the urgency of the crisis, the Commission
enabled rapid policy drafting and created an explicit linkage between refugee policy and trade policy. This linkage provided
the member states with the motivation to adopt the proposal as a solution to the ongoing migration crisis.
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1. Introduction
In 2015, the number of refugees entering Europe surged
to over onemillion. In July 2016, the EU–Jordan Compact
(hereinafter referred to as the Compact) was signed
to provide the refugee‐hosting state of Jordan with
economic support and trade benefits. The Compact
is recognized as being a groundbreaking and ‘holistic’
idea because of its innovative use of trade conces‐
sions as a tool in refugee policy (Betts & Collier, 2017;
Temprano‐Arroyo, 2018). It is even considered to be a
relevant model that can be exported to other refugee‐
hosting nations (Brandt & Kirisci, 2019; Temprano‐Arroyo,
2018). This article explains the actions of the units
within the EU Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
Commission) in the intra‐institutional negotiations, thus
unpacking how the Compact was created and why it was
adopted. The EU has been criticized for not coordinating
external action across policy fields (i.e., Börzel & Risse,
2004;Gebhard, 2011;Monar, 2015;Wolff, 2008). A lack of
coordination has been explicitly demonstrated in the case
of external migration and trade policy (Jurje & Lavenex,
2014). I argue that the external relations units within
the Commission along with the External Action Service
leveraged the migration crisis to increase their influence
within the Commission by arguing that trade concessions
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were themost appropriatemeasure and by reframing the
responsibilities of the directorate‐general (DG) for Trade,
and furthermore that they created interest alignment
with the member states through issue‐linkage. Building
on and further expanding crisisification theory (Rhinard,
2019), the article demonstrates how actors utilized the
migration crisis to overcome internal silos and create a
rapid policy response. The study has relevance for EU
external policies more broadly, as it contributes to mod‐
els of intra‐institutional bargaining and shows how actors,
through the reframing of issues and responsibilities, can
contribute to changing the position of a powerful and
conservative actor such as the DG for Trade (McKenzie &
Maissner, 2017, p. 837; Sicurelli, 2015).
The Compact is a bilateral agreement between the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the EU and its
member states, adopted by the EU–Jordan Association
Council in July 2016. According to Poli (2020, p. 83) it
can be argued that the Compact is a legal hybrid because
although the EU–Jordan Association Council has legally
binding powers, their decision was only to recommend
that the Compact be implemented. It was inspired by the
UN Compact, but the EU launched its own Compact with
stronger commitments using the more efficient policy
tools at the EU’s disposal (Betts & Collier, 2017). The EU
offered Jordan trade concessions aimed at increasing
exports to Europe, contingent on Jordan providing Syrian
refugeeswith access to their labormarket (Council of the
European Union, 2016). The Compact was negotiated at
the height of the EUmigration (management) crisiswhen
migration was a highly contentious and politicized issue.
The contribution of this article lies in its demonstration
of how the Commission used the crisis to influence pol‐
icy. Furthermore, this contribution relates to the Politics
and Governance thematic issue on The Impact of Rule
Change onPolicyOutputs, by highlighting the effects that
external shocks can have on the relative power of EU
institutions and on policy output.
Research on the Compact has thus far been mostly
limited to reports, many of them done on assign‐
ment for the Compact’s main donors, i.e., the UN
and the EU (e.g., Agulhas, 2019; Center for Global
Development, 2017; Overseas Development Institute,
2018; Temprano‐Arroyo, 2018). The exceptions include
academic articles that focus on the (thus far disappoint‐
ing) effects that the Compact has had on refugees’ access
to rights and the labor market (GrayMeral, 2020; Lenner
& Turner, 2018; Mencutek & Nashwan, 2020; Turner,
2021). The policy process behind it has so far only
been explored from the Jordanian side (Seeberg, 2020;
Seeberg & Zardo, 2020). Donor state engagement is iden‐
tified as a key factor in the success of refugee compacts
without explaining donor state involvement in Jordan
(Gray Meral, 2020; Lenner & Turner, 2018; Mencutek &
Nashwan, 2020). An exploration of the legal aspects of
the Compact has been offered by Poli (2020). Although
she hints that there may be pragmatic reasons for the
hybrid format, she does not explain this (Poli, 2020,
p. 83). Furthermore, she argues that the Compact is
an example of the rising number of practical and infor‐
mal agreements in the EU’s external migration policy,
which have negative consequences for the balance of
power between the EU institutions as it undermines the
role of the EU Parliament (Poli, 2020, p. 80). This article
explains donor state involvement and sheds light on the
crisis policy process that leads to such sui generis pol‐
icy outcomes.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the driving forces behind the external dimension of the
EU’s migration policy, first from its emergence in the
1980s until the crisis, and then since the migration cri‐
sis. In Section 3, the causal model explaining how the
migration crisis affected the Commission’s ability to cre‐
ate the Compact is presented. In Section 4, the method‐
ology behind the data collection is described. Section 5
presents the analysis, tracing the negotiations. Section 6
provides a summary of the empirical findings and a dis‐
cussion of the theoretical implications of the case study.
2. EU External Migration Policy
2.1. Before the Migration Crisis, 1980s–2014
While the external dimension of migration policy has
recently gained more interest, it is by no means a
new phenomenon. Since the 1980s, the member states
have increasingly collaborated with countries outside
of the EU on issues of migration (Guiraudon, 2002).
The external dimension of migration policy was offi‐
cially embraced at the EU level in 1999 (Lavenex &
Kunz, 2008). At the Tampere European Council in 1999,
the member states declared their ambition for a ‘com‐
prehensive approach’ to migration, which they defined
as addressing political, human rights, and development
issues in countries and regions of origin and transit
(European Council, 1999). However, a review of the liter‐
ature reveals that the expressedwill for a comprehensive
approach failed to translate into policy and that there are
two main explanations as to why. The first being that
the comprehensive approach has been sidelined by a
securitization approach pursued by actors in themember
states who found less containing factors at the EU level
and with the external dimension in their pursuit of policy
goals (Boswell, 2003; Guiraudon, 2002; Lavenex, 2006,
2018). Law and order officials strategically moved migra‐
tion discussions to the EU level where they faced less
opposition from political parties and civil society than
at the member state level (Guiraudon, 2002) and fur‐
ther on to the external dimension (Lavenex, 2006). They
achieved this by framingmigration as a security issue and
linking it to other global security threats that demanded
transnational solutions (Guiraudon, 2002, p. 260).
The second reason for the failure of the comprehen‐
sive approach is that the Commission has not been able
to cooperate across issue areas to create and push for
comprehensive policy proposals (Boswell, 2003; Jurje &
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Lavenex, 2014). Immigration ministers favored security
policies rather than policies that fall under the portfo‐
lio of development and foreign affairs officials because
they wanted to limit migration without losing autonomy
(Boswell, 2003, p. 626; Lavenex, 2006). This tensionwent
both ways, as development and foreign affairs officials
were not interested in having their policy field down‐
graded to merely being a tool for reducing migration
(Boswell, 2003). At the Commission level, such tension
resulted in resistance against integrating migration pre‐
vention goals into the EU’s external policy (Boswell, 2003,
p. 626). The EU’s ability to create coordinated, strate‐
gic action in its external relations has been questioned
(Börzel & Risse, 2004; Gebhard, 2011; Jurje & Lavenex,
2014; Monar, 2015; Wolff, 2008). An example of this is
migration and trade policy. Jurje and Lavenex (2014) find
that the EU has not leveraged its market power to push
its migration agenda in trade negotiations. The content
of EU trade agreements reflected the institutional setup
of the EU rather than relevant aspects of the third coun‐
try, such as the number of migrants (Jurje & Lavenex,
2014). Jurje and Lavenex (2014) argue that international
migration was characterized by competing frames that
cut across bureaucratic divides, whichmade it difficult to
find shared ideals. This article makes an important con‐
tribution because it demonstrates how the Commission
was able to bridge migration and trade in external pol‐
icy by reframing the crisis in Jordan as a developmental
and economic issue and by reframing the responsibilities
of the DG for Trade. This argument has implications for
the broader literature on EU external policies that often
use models of institutional bargaining and which empha‐
size the tension between actors that pursue values and
those that pursue commercial interests (see, for exam‐
ple, Gstöhl & Hanf, 2014; McKenzie & Maissner, 2017;
Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006; Sicurelli, 2015).
2.2. The Migration Crisis
Migration and asylum policies have always been politi‐
cally salient, but the events in 2015 and 2016 changed
the dynamics of decision making as they became issues
of “high level crisis governance” (Smeets & Beach, 2020,
p. 135). In one year, the EU received more than one mil‐
lion refugees andmigrants, resulting in a political crisis in
which the core principles of EU integration broke down
(Zaun, 2018). In addition, the migration (management)
crisis hit the EU’s image as a human rights promoter,
when more than three thousand refugees drowned
on the journey toward European shores (International
Organization for Migration, 2016). In response to the cri‐
sis, the EU attempted to limit migration by striking deals
with countries outside of Europe. These agreements
are sui generis and often informal, meaning that the
European Parliament is left out of the decision‐making
process (Poli, 2020).
Examples of intergovernmental bargains include the
agreements with Turkey, Lebanon, and with countries in
North Africa and the Sahel. The agreement with Turkey
is an extreme example of a protection strategy, wherein
the aim is to control the EU border and limit the inflow
of refugees, rather than a comprehensive strategy, which
would also address the reasons for secondarymovement
among refugees in Turkey. Several other, lesser‐known
strategic partnerships with third countries have been
established since themigration crisis. AcrossNorth Africa
and in the Sahel region, the EU train police forces, mon‐
itor border controls, and push for the criminalization
of smuggling activities (Bøås, 2019). The Compact with
Jordan is another example of a pragmatic bilateral agree‐
ment. However, it stands out because it provides a more
comprehensive approach to the causes of migration by
addressing issues such as job opportunities for refugees
(Poli, 2020).
So far, the policy responses to the crisis have been
understood as being driven by the European Council
(Lavenex, 2018; Smeets & Beach, 2020; Trauner & Ripoll
Servent, 2016). Because of the increased politicization
of migration policy, the member states wanted to regain
national control over the issue (Lavenex, 2018). This has
been the main explanation of the rise in intergovern‐
mental bargains betweenmember states and third coun‐
tries, and protectionist policies (Greenhill, 2016; Lavenex,
2018). This development underlined the relevance of
theories such as postfunctionalism and new intergov‐
ernmentalism (e.g., Bickerton et al., 2015; Hooghe &
Marks, 2018; Kleine & Pollack, 2018; Schmidt, 2018;
Smeets & Zaun, 2020), which both share the idea that
a transition of power and influence has taken place,
i.e., from the supranational level to the intergovernmen‐
tal level. These explanations emphasize that with the
rise of the European Council, the Commission and the
European Parliament have been marginalized in EU poli‐
cymaking. However, such accounts fail to explain how the
Commission was able to shape external migration policy,
as in the case of the EU–Jordan Compact.
3. Explaining the Success of the Commission
The policymaking literature theorizes how actors adapt
to changing circumstances and how they utilize change
to gain influence (Trauner & Ripoll Servent, 2016,
p. 1420). Indeed, changes in the decision‐making arena
can be caused not only by institutional change but
also by external shocks (Håkansson, 2021; Kaunert,
2010a, 2010b; Ripoll Servent, 2019; Trauner & Ripoll
Servent, 2016). A decade involving several severe
crises has affected EU decision‐making procedures, and
Rhinard (2019) describes a process of ‘crisisification.’
Crisisification of decision‐making procedures involves
“finding the next urgent event, prioritizing speed in
decision‐making, ushering in new constellations of con‐
cerned actors and emphasizing new narratives of what
matters in European governance” (Rhinard, 2019, p. 617).
A crisis in itself does not affect the influence of dif‐
ferent actors, but it is a window of opportunity that
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can be leveraged by actors in different ways (Trauner &
Ripoll Servent, 2016). A two‐stage process drives crisisi‐
fication (see Figure 1): The first stage takes place in the
urgent aftermath of a crisis, wherein there is a demand
for a political response, i.e., a ‘call for action,’ to which
symbolic commitments by member states are often the
first response (Rhinard, 2019). In the second stage, such
commitments are leveraged by the Commission to build
momentum for policy change (Rhinard, 2019). In fact,
Rhinard (2019, p. 622) goes so far as to argue that
when it comes to crisis‐related responses the Council
will support the Commission in virtually any policy area.
However, exactly how the Commission can make use of
the crisis dynamic is not explained. This article unpacks
stage two of crisisification theory as it peers into the gray
box (Figure 1).
I use process‐tracing methodology, following the
guidelines of Beach and Pedersen (2019), to trace the
negotiations that led to the Compact. The case study
unpacks the second stage of crisisification theory: how
the Commission can build momentum for policy change
following a call for action. It explains this as a four‐
step process, wherein cohesion is created within the
Commission and the approval of member states is
achieved. The four steps of themechanismare presented
in Figure 2. The Commission was able to leverage the
crisis to act as a cohesive actor by reframing the crisis
(Step 1) and identifying the appropriate tools, and by
reframing the responsibilities of the directorates‐general
responsible for those tools (Step 2). Furthermore, the
Commission was able to efficiently draft a policy pro‐
posal covering a broad set of issues by leveraging the
urgency of the crisis to assemble a cross‐sectoral work‐
ing group (Step 3). Issue‐linkage enabled the Commission
to gain the approval of the member states by presenting
them with policy solutions to issues made high‐priority
by the crisis (Step 4). The operationalization of themech‐
anism is presented in the Supplementary File, which also
includes an evaluation of the strength of the data for
each step of the mechanism.
3.1. Reframing
For a crisis to be converted into a policy response, dou‐
ble framing is required: First, a situation needs to be
identified as a crisis; second, the nature and character
of the crisis need to be specified (Voltolini et al., 2020,
p. 620). The first stage of crisisification explains that
member states will often respond urgently to what they
perceive to be a crisis and ask for action. I argue that
the Commission leadership can build on this request and
specify the nature and character of the crisis (Step 1).
For example, they can argue that it is a humanitarian or
developmental issue, instead of a security issue. Through
such reframing, the Commission can argue for the use of
alternative policy tools such as humanitarian aid or trade
policy as appropriate measures with which to address
the crisis.
Furthermore, a crisis can be used to challenge the
perceived appropriateness of existing normative frames
such as perceived roles and responsibilities. I argue
that the Commission leadership can exploit a crisis to
expand an institution’s understanding of its responsibil‐
ities (Step 2). For example, the terrorist attacks of 9/11
were used to reframe the EU as an actor in ‘high poli‐
tics’ (den Boer & Monar, 2002). Through reframing, the
Commission leadership can advocate for the use of pol‐
icy tools governed by one directorate‐general on issues
administered by another. In this case, the Commission
leadership wanted to use trade concessions as a tool
in refugee policy. Such policy proposals can be further
legitimized by appealing to the EU as a ‘Union of values’
(Lavenex, 2018), making opposition more difficult.
3.2. Issue‐Linkage
The embeddedways ofworking that are considered to be
appropriate can be challenged in an urgent setting, and
the Commission can implement administrative reforms
to improve its efficiency in response to calls to ‘do some‐
thing’ (Rhinard, 2019). I argue that this creates opportu‐
nities for establishing new informal working structures
Migraon crisis  Commission
leverages momentum  
Policy changeCall for acon
Crisisifica on stage 1 Crisisifica on stage 2
Figure 1. Crisisification theory illustrated.
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Figure 2. Four‐step causal model explaining how the Commission leveraged the refugee crisis.
that cut across existing silos, such as aworking group or a
taskforce (Step 3). Lewis (2010) argues that a high degree
of insulation, a broad scope of issues, and intensive inter‐
action all promote cooperative negotiations between
member states in the Council (of Ministers). His the‐
ory is here transferred to the Commission to argue how
cross‐sectoral cooperation can be cultivated to achieve
efficient policy drafting across issue areas. This influ‐
ences the efficiency of the technical drafting of a pro‐
posal, which happens at a lower level of the Commission.
However, cohesiveness in the Commission is a neces‐
sary condition for the working group to be successful.
Lower‐ranking desk officers who take part in the techni‐
cal drafting do not have the freedom to go beyond their
responsibilities which are defined by others higher up in
the system.
If the Commission does achieve rapid drafting of
a policy solution involving several issue areas, I argue
that it increases the likelihood of a policy package being
adopted by the member states (Step 4). Through linkage,
the Commission can include high‐priority issues for the
member states in their proposal. However, for this to be
successful the Commission needs to be quick in the draft‐
ing so that they can leverage the pressure that member
states experience during an urgent crisis. This pressure
is what makes the issue a priority for the member states
and makes issue‐linkage effective.
4. Data
The analysis is based on the main document stipulat‐
ing the Compact, i.e., the annex to the 2016–2018
EU–Jordan Partnership Priorities and Compact (Council
of the European Union, 2016), as well as on origi‐
nal interviews with EU representatives with knowledge
of the negotiations. The interviews were conducted
between March and September 2020, online or via tele‐
phone. The interviews lasted between 50 and 90 min‐
utes. They were semi‐structured (following an inter‐
view guide developed after document analysis of the
agreement). Fourteen EU representatives were identi‐
fied by means of snowball sampling. In the final round
of interviews, the participants referred me only to peo‐
ple whom I had already interviewed, signaling that
I had already identified the key individuals who were
involved. Only one interviewee declined because of
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limited time, producing a total number of 13 inter‐
views. The interviewees represent most of the relevant
Commission units that are likely to have been involved
in the process. Interviews were conducted with repre‐
sentatives from the DGs for: Trade, Neighborhood and
Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR), Migration and Home
Affairs, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
Operations (ECHO), and Economic and Financial Affairs
(ECFIN). A member of a Commissioner’s cabinet also par‐
ticipated. In addition, representatives from the European
External Action Service (EEAS) and from the Amman del‐
egation also participated.
The participants include desk officers, directors, and
a cabinet member. Eight of the interviewees were active
participants in the negotiations or the drafting, one inter‐
viewee was active in the concluding phase, and four
were active in the implementation of the Compact. All of
them possessed knowledge of what took place during
the negotiations, either through direct participation or
through accounts given to them by their colleagues
who had participated. Although there are obvious advan‐
tages of first‐hand accounts, second‐hand accounts can
(arguably) be less at risk of social desirability bias because
they have less inclination to exaggerate or to describe the
participants in an advantageous way. Accounts that sup‐
port the steps of the mechanism should be confirmed by
several sources (see Table 1 in the Supplementary File
for operationalization). By including interviewees from
different units and at different levels, and by including
participants with first‐hand knowledge as well as their
colleagues with second‐hand knowledge, there is some
width in the data collection to allow for triangulation.
All interviewees requested anonymity so that they
could speak freely, thus providing me with better data.
To ensure this, all interviewees are referred to by the
numbers 1 to 13. Because it was a relatively small
group of people participating in the policymaking pro‐
cess, revealing their institution or position in the pub‐
lication might jeopardize their anonymity. I have, how‐
ever, borne in mind their position and institution while
evaluating the strength of the data (see Table 1 in the
Supplementary File).
5. Tracing the Negotiations
5.1. Reframing
Jordan had long wanted to increase its exports to Europe
and had formally requested a relaxation of the rules of
origin before the Syria conflict began. This demand was
rejected by the Commission partly because DG Trade
was reluctant to grant just one country in the neighbor‐
hood special conditions (Interviews 3, 5, 7, 13). The first
two steps of the mechanism explain how units within
the Commission were able to leverage the crisis to cre‐
ate internal unity, which was necessary to successfully
have the Compact adopted. The first entails a reframing
of the nature of the crisis. DG NEAR and the EEAS had
very similar understandings of the situation in Jordan.
Several of the interviewees from DG NEAR and the EEAS
underlined that the dire economic situation in Jordan
already existed before the refugee crisis, as a result of the
many years of conflict and a lack of stability in the region
(Interviews 1, 10). They also argued that the additional
burden of hosting 650,000 refugees had made the situ‐
ation worse. Furthermore, there are accounts that sup‐
port the notion that economic issues in Jordanwere their
main motivation for the Compact: “Obviously, the narra‐
tives and the response to the Syrian crisis contributed
to the discourse around development assistance in the
southernMediterranean, but I don’t think that theywere
the main driver in this case” (Interview 10). Another
interviewee referred to the importance of having a sta‐
ble partner in the region, one that is a good ally for the
EU in geopolitics, and further stated:
All these factors make it very important for us that
Jordan remains there as a stable country, so this
is really the long‐term interest. It would be tragic
if Jordan were to fall, and everything is targeted
towards the objective of making them sustainable in
the long term. (Interview 1)
Across the different DGs in Commission, they all per‐
ceived the situation in Jordan to be an urgent crisis;
furthermore, the DG NEAR and the EEAS considered
the crisis to be economic in nature and that it was fur‐
ther exasperated by the refugee situation. They argued
that the crisis was economic in nature and reframed it
from a refugee issue to an economic and development
issue. Representatives from DG ECFIN expressed that
they understood the crisis in Jordan to be an economic
one (Interview 3) and this explains why also they were
in favor of granting Jordan trade preferences. DG ECHO
wanted to better the livelihoods of refugees living in
Jordan, and so theywelcomedpolicies that could provide
jobs for refugees (Interview 11). By successfully refram‐
ing the crisis as an economic and developmental one,
the interests and understandings of some of the differ‐
ent units in the Commission were aligned.
Furthermore, by framing the crisis as a developmen‐
tal and humanitarian one, trade policy was made an
appropriate measure with which to respond to the cri‐
sis. This meant that DG for Trade, i.e., the DG governing
EU trade policy, became a key actor when moving for‐
ward in the negotiations. In the initial inter‐service con‐
sultations in the Commission, DG ECFIN, DG NEAR, and
DG ECHO were all very much in favor of providing trade
preferences linked to assisting the refugees in Jordan
(Interview 3). DG for Migration and Home Affairs was
notmuch involved, because so few refugees from Jordan
travelled onwards towards Europe, they were not stake‐
holders in the process (Interview 8). However, DG for
Tradewas initially reluctant. This leads to the second step
of the mechanism, which entails getting the support of
the relevant DG.
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DG for Trade did not agree that external migration
policy fell within their responsibilities. DG for Trade was
described by several interviewees as being orthodox,
mercantile, and working primarily for the protection of
the economic interests of member states (Interviews 3,
6, 10, 13). Another perspective on this is that the DG for
Trade was very sensitive and responsive to the member
states’ positions in trade policy because they regularly
discussed it with them in the Trade Policy Committee.
This means that the DG for Trade knew what the mem‐
ber states would, and would not, be able to accept. In
order to get the DG for Trade to work toward the politi‐
cal goal set by the EEAS and DG NEAR, which was now a
goal shared by other DGs in the Commission such as DG
ECHOandDGECFIN, tremendous pressurewas placed on
the DG for Trade to support the proposal (Interviews 4,
9, 13). The High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, i.e., Federica Mogherini, and
directors in both DG NEAR and the EEAS, as well as
Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström were all push‐
ing the DG. The United Kingdom was an important ally
and advocate for Jordan and the Compact, with the
British ambassador visiting a DG for Trade director to
present trade concessions as a solution to the crisis in
Jordan (Interviews 5, 7). This broad alliance of players
from both within and outside the Commission argued
that there was a sense of urgency because of the cri‐
sis and, furthermore, that trade policy was the relevant
tool to use in order to resolve the crisis. This argumen‐
tation was effective in persuading the DG for Trade to
expand their responsibilities and created unity in the
Commission in the pursuit of the Compact. This confirms
the second step of the mechanism. By February 2016,
the DG for Trade was very much leading the policy pro‐
cess. They were chef de field in the negotiations within
the Commission as well as vis‐à‐vis the member states in
the Trade Policy Committee in the Council (Interviews 3,
7, 13). One DG for Trade representative expressed that
trade was considered the most appropriate solution:
Of course, helping Syrian refugees is a political objec‐
tive, if I may put it thatway, but it is a trade‐related ini‐
tiative contributing to a political objective because at
that moment it was considered to be themost appro‐
priate one.
One high‐ranking official within the DG for Trade at the
time explained this shift partly with the ambition of the
DG for Trade to be responsible outside of their immedi‐
ate issue area:
I thought that we had to demonstrate that [our DG]
could be responsive to this kind of political and social
situation, like the one that had been generated by
the refugee crisis, and that it was, therefore, better
that we were proactive and that we started from the
beginning to try to explore solutions.
Even though the DG for Trade took ownership over the
Compact, this does not necessarily signify a more per‐
manent expansion of the DG’s responsibilities to include
migration issues. Interviewees from inside and outside
of the DG for Trade did not believe that this signified
a permanent shift in the understanding of their role
(Interviews 4, 9, 13). The case does, however, demon‐
strate how DG NEAR and the EEAS were able to use the
momentum of the crisis to create internal cohesion.
5.2. Issue‐Linkage
Crisisification theory explains that a call for action by the
member states will follow shortly after a crisis (Rhinard,
2019). In 2015, the Council asked the Commission and
the EU delegation in Amman to do “anything possible”
for the ongoing refugee crisis (Interview 5). This enabled
the Commission to move forward with a rapid drafting
of the policy proposal—step three of the mechanism.
The call for action triggered a change in working struc‐
tures, as a small working group was set up with mem‐
bers from the EU’s Amman delegation, the EEAS, and
technical expertise from the DG for Trade and DG NEAR
(Interviews 5, 9, 13). The small working group engaged
in cooperative negotiations by working in a separate and
small group of people allowing a high level of trust, work‐
ing on broad scopes of issues, and working very inten‐
sively over a short period. They succeeded in creating the
first draft by October 2015. The draft was, in fact, written
by a desk officer in the DG for Trade, which demonstrates
the necessity of getting the DG to contribute to the pol‐
icy process. Members of the working group described
the process as being unique in that it was highly inten‐
sive, and theyworked very closely together day andnight.
One member claimed that some did not last long there
because of the pressure (Interview 9). Furthermore, they
argued that it was the sense of urgency caused by the cri‐
sis enabled this new working structure (Interviews 3, 5).
People who were not part of the initial negotiations sup‐
ported the claim of how remarkably quick the develop‐
ment of the proposal was (Interview 2). The very novel
idea was remarkably drafted within only a few months
of the group being given the assignment.
In this working group, the novel idea of linking trade
concessions to the employment of refugees was further
developed from a vague idea into a highly technical
policy proposal (Interview 2). In February 2016, at the
London Syria Conference, the EU made their first public
commitment to offering Jordan trade concessions contin‐
gent on Jordan granting work permits to Syrian refugees
(Interview 3).
During the final phase of the negotiations, from
February to July 2016, there were expectations that
the EU would deliver on the commitments made to
Jordan at the London Conference and to the Syrian
refugees living in Jordan. The member states’ refusal to
receive more refugees provided further motivation to
assist the refugee‐hosting countries outside of the EU
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(Interviews 6, 9). The tragic number of deaths at
sea further escalated domestic pressure for EU action
(Interviews 1, 5). The final step of the mechanism
involves convincing the member states to adopt the pol‐
icy proposal. The Compact was not supported by all
member states initially, but the crisis led to increased
pressure for them to act:
Somemember states initially were not terribly enthu‐
siastic. They insisted that they could accept it because
of the very special political situation and provided
that there was a very strong linkage to refugees.
(Interview 7)
DG for Trade was identified as a crucial advocate for the
Compact. Because the DG for Trade benefits from a posi‐
tion as trusted experts in trade, and because trade is an
exclusive competence of the Commission, theywere able
to push the member states to agree to the trade con‐
cessions (Interview 13). They achieved this by presenting
projections for expected imports from Jordan indicating
that there was little risk involved for any member states.
Themember states with large textile industries were par‐
ticularly concerned because textile products would ben‐
efit from the trade preferences (Interview 2). The mem‐
ber states were also worried about other countries with
larger economies, such as Morocco or Tunisia, asking for
similar benefits. The DG for Trade drafted the agreement
in such a way that the trade preferences only applied
to businesses in Special Economic Zones in Jordan that
employed a minimum share of refugees, ensuring that
no other country would be able to ask for a similar agree‐
ment (Interviews 2, 7, 13). The important role the DG
for Trade played in convincing the member states under‐
lines the importance of internal cohesion within the
Commission (Step 2 of the mechanism). Furthermore,
the Commission realized that linking the migration cri‐
sis to their proposal was a clever way of motivating the
member states to adopt the proposal:
2015 was, of course, the year of migration crisis for
the EU, so there was a recognition that we did not
want refugees to leave their countries of temporary
residence bordering Syria. For me, it is quite a clever
way of dealing with the issue and it would have been
attractive to many people in the EU system and to
many of the member states. (Interview 6)
This suggests that step four of the mechanism is present.
Another participant noted how time‐sensitive the pro‐
posal was, arguing that only a few months later, the dis‐
cussions in Europe were completely different in nature
and that there would have been little political will to pri‐
oritize aid to refugees outside of Europe (Interview 4).
This demonstrates how important it is that the draft‐
ing (Step 3) be efficient for the mechanism to work.
The European Parliament was not formally involved in
the negotiations, but they were briefed on the proposal
by the Commission (Interviews 3, 4). The Commission
wanted to convince the Parliament that the Compactwas
necessary because they wanted to have as broad a coali‐
tion as possible to avoid any push back (Interviews 4, 5).
The sense of urgency that was necessary for the
Commission to succeed in drafting and defending the
Compact shed some light on the sui generis format of
the Compact. The formatwas pragmatic in the sense that
it ensured swift drafting and adoption. The EU–Jordan
Association Council adopted the Compact in July 2016,
but as pointed out by Poli (2020, p. 83), in the joint
decision the parties only recommended implementation
(EU–Jordan Association Council, 2016, p. 1). The phras‐
ing of the implementation as a recommendation rather
than something more binding reflected concerns on the
Jordanian side regarding the granting of Syrians’ access
to work permits (Interviews 12, 13).
6. Conclusion
Through tracing the internal EU negotiations that led to
the Compact, this article demonstrates the presence of a
causal mechanism explaining how external relation units
within the Commission and the EEAS can leverage a crisis
to influence external EU policy. They argued that there
was a dire economic situation in Jordan and that the
additional burden of hosting 650,000 refugees hadmade
the situation worse. This reframing of the refugee crisis
meant that development assistance tools such as trade
concessions became appropriate measures with which
to address the situation. As trade policy is governed by
the DG for Trade, pressure was put on the DG from a
broad alliance of players including the Commissioner for
Trade, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, the EEAS, DG NEAR, DG ECHO,
DG ECFIN, and the United Kingdom. The DG for Trade
assumed this responsibility and went on to lead the
negotiations internally as well as vis‐à‐vis the member
states in the Trade Policy Committee in the Council.
However, accounts suggest that this was a temporary
expansion of responsibilities that may not be long‐lived.
The Commission set up a cross‐sectoral working group
that was tasked with the urgent assignment of creating
a policy proposal for the Compact. The group efficiently
created a highly technical proposal with explicit linkages
between refugee policy and trade policy. This proposal
was presented to the member states as an important
solution to the ongoing migration (management) crisis
that was playing out in Europe, and the member states
accepted the proposal after being convinced by the DG
for Trade. The conclusion of informal agreements with
third countries such as the Compact with Jordan is not
prohibited by EU law, but as Poli argues (2020, p. 80),
it does have consequences for the balance of power
between the EU institutions. This article has demon‐
strated how a crisis can be leveraged by actors in the
Commission who aim to influence policy outcomes, and
how this results in informal policy processes that do not
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include the European Parliament. In addition, this arti‐
cle has explained how reframing contributed to the DG
for Trade assuming the role as a reluctant initiator of
the Compact—this has implications for institutional bar‐
gainingmodels used to explain EU external policies more
broadly, such as trade (Gstöhl & Hanf, 2014; McKenzie &
Maissner, 2017; Sicurelli, 2015).
The causal mechanism presented in this article
expands crisisification theory, which suggests that the
Commission can make use of crises to influence pol‐
icy (Rhinard, 2019). The mechanism described in this
article explains only one of many processes that have
contributed to the Compact. The roles of several
important actors, such as the Jordanian government,
the UN Refugee Agency, the United Kingdom, and
the European Council, are not included in this study.
Additional case studies on the Commission’s role in exter‐
nal EU policies during crises are needed, as they could
contribute to strengthening or revising the mechanism
presented in this article.
Finally, this article provides important empirical find‐
ings on the negotiation process behind this hitherto
under‐researched Compact. If the Compact approach is
to be replicated in other refugee‐hosting nations, it is
important to understand how it came about from the
perspective of the main donor, i.e., the EU. Based on the
empirical findings presented in this article, it is doubt‐
ful that a similar policy output will be replicated in the
future. It is not likely that the DG for Tradewill contribute
to the same degree in future contexts, and it is doubtful
that themember states will find themselves in an equally
politicized crisis.
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